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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-6/2/77 
In the Matter of 
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW ROCHELLE, INC., 
: BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
Respondent, 
- and - : 
CASE No. U-2171 
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Charging Party. 
The charge herein was filed by /the City of New Rochelle (City). It 
alleges that the Police Association of New Rochelle (Association) violated 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (the Act), CSL §209-a.2(b), by refusin 
to negotiate in good faith in that it improperly insisted upon negotiating 
demands that are not mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Association sub-
mitted six of these demands to interest arbitration pursuant to CSL §209.4. 
The remaining demands that had been protested by the City were withdrawn by 
the Association and the City has withdrawn its charge with respect to those 
demands. 
The dispute is one that raises questions concerning the scope of nego-
tiations under the Act and it has been processed under §204.4 of our Rules. 
Under this procedure, there has been no intermediate report by a hearing 
officer; rather, the stipulation and the pleadings, which constitute the record 
of the proceedings, and the parties' memoranda of law, were submitted directly 
to this Board. 
The First and Second Demands 
The first two demands that are before us are #18 and #20, which read 
as follows: 
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"#18. Disciplinary Procedures (Re-Assignments) . 
If an employee is reassigned, he shall, if he so requests, 
receive written reasons for such action. If the employee, after 
receiving the written reasons, wishes to do so, he may use the 
grievance machinery as provided in the contract. No employee 
shall be re-assigned as a form of discipline, prior to the 
completion of a departmental hearing and the publication of the 
results thereof, unless the employee consents to such re-assign-
ment. For the purpose of this section, if an employee is re-
assigned, subsequent to his committing an act which results in 
the-commencement of disciplinary"action against him but before 
the completion of a departmental hearing and publication of the 
results thereof, it shall be presumed that the employee was 
re-assigned as a form of discipline." 
"#20. Disciplinary Procedures (Representation). 
An employee under internal investigation shall have the right 
to have present during the period of interrogation a representative 
of the UNION and/or an attorney. The representative shall be 
excused from duty for a sufficient period of time necessary to 
assist the employee who has requested his presence. The employee 
shall be given a reasonable opportunity to notify such representa-
tive and/or attorney, but the period of interrogation shall not be 
delayed for more than one CI) hour because such representative 
and/or attorney is unable to be present, Such representative and/or 
attorney shall have the right to be present during the period of 
interrogation to confer with and advise the employee." 
Both of these demands would supplement and modify the disciplinary 
procedures specified in CSL §75 and, for that reason, we do not agree that they- are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. Demand #18 would prohibit the City from 
reassigning an employee "as a form of discipline" unless certain proposed 
preliminary procedures are fulfilled. CSL §75 does not provide for such 
preliminary procedures. It provides that employees may be disciplined before 
the available procedures are utilized or exhausted. Demand #20 deals with 
representation of a person against whom disciplinary action is being considered. 
This, too, is covered by CSL §75. It provides that "A person against whom 
removal or other disciplinary action is proposed shall have written notice 
thereof and...the person or persons holding such hearing shall, upon request 
of the person against whom charges are preferred, permit him to be represented 
by counsel " '' . M^Q'% 
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In our view, a comparison of sections 75 and 76 and their underlying 
history indicate that, except for employees of the State of New York, the 
statutory provisions of section 75 relating to removal and other disciplinary 
proceedings are preemptive of the subj ect matter and are not open to collective 
negotiation. In 1972, CSL §76.4 was amended to include the following language: 
"Such sections [CSL sections 75 and 76] may be supplemented, 
modified or replaced by agreements negotiated between the 
state and an employee organization pursuant to article 
fourteen of this chapter." (emphasis supplied) 
In his memorandum, the Governor explained that this amendment would "permit 
Sections 75 and 76 to be replaced by provisions contained in a negotiated 
agreement;", New York State Legislative Annual, 1972, page 39. 
It is significant that the only public employer to which the 1972 
amendment expressly applies is New York State. McKinney's Statutes, §240, 
states: 
"The maxim expressio uriius est exclusio alterius is applied 
in the construction of the statutes, so that where a law 
expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to 
which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn 
that what is omitted or not included was intended to be 
omitted or excluded." 
Supporting our conclusion that the reference to "the State" in CSL §76.4 
excludes other "governments", or "public employers", as those terms are 
defined in the Act, is S. 4482, a 1977 program bill of the Governor which, 
among other things, would amend CSL §76.4 by substituting the phrase, "a 
public employer" for "the state" and would also introduce similar language 
into §3020-a of the Education Law. The Governor's supporting memorandum 
states that "The bill would amend Section 76 of the Civil Service Law and 
Section 3020-a of the Education Law ^to_ permit all public employers to negotiate 
disciplinary and dismissal procedures in their collective agreements with 
employee organizations." (emphasis added) 
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Accordingly, under present law, we conclude that public employers 
other than the State of New York are not permitted to negotiate collective 
agreements containing disciplinary procedures that would supplement, modify or 
replace the provisions of CSL §§75 or 76. To the extent that the Association's 
demands would do this, they are prohibited subjects of negotiation. The 
Association's insistence upon taking such demands to interest arbitration 
constitutes a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith. 
The Third Demand 
Demand #21 reads as follows: 
"#21. Disciplinary Procedures (Statement by Employee). 
An employee who is being questioned for a violation of the 
Rules and Regulations which could constitute a criminal charge 
if he were prosecuted, shall not be compelled to give a 
statement even for administrative purposes only. An employee 
shall be compelled to submit only his official police report." 
This demand is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. It is directed 
to an investigation of a violation of rules and regulations "which :co.uld 
constitute a criminal charge." It is the inherent governmental function of the 
City's police department to investigate all possible criminal acts that may 
have occurred within its jurisdiction, including those criminal violations 
that may have been perpetrated by policemen. Even if the duty to negotiate 
were deemed to extend to investigations of departmental misconduct by policemen, 
it could not embrace conduct that might constitute the.subject 'of a criminal in*-
vestigation.j, The^City, cannot be compelled to relinquish its 'essential responsi-
bility by negotiating over a demand to^insulate .its police officers from such an 
investigation. See Troy Uniformed Firefighters Association, 10 PERB 1(3015(1977) 
The Fourth Demand 
Demand #27 reads as follows: 
"#27. Required Equipment. 
An employee shall be provided with the following equipment so 
long as such equipment is required by the Department:' my^g^^ 
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(a) rubber reflectorized raincoats and boots 
(b) billies 
(c) handcuffs 
Detectives to be issued stainless steel two (2") inch barrel 
revolvers on heavy duty frame." 
The demand that employees be provided with equipment "so long as such 
equipment is required by the department" is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
It is in essence an economic matter of whether the employees should be required 
to acquire and pay for the equipment they must use in the. performance of their 
duties. This is a term and condition of employment. 
The demand that employees be furnished by the employer with a certain 
type of revolver is not, however, a mandatory subject of negotiation. We 
have already determined in Matter of City of Albany, 7 PERB 1(3078 (1974), that 
the selection of weapons and their tactical deployment involves the manner and 
means by which a city serves its constituency and hence is a management 
prerogative. 
The Fifth Demand 
Demand #28 reads as follows: 
"#28. Equipment (For Police Vehicles). 
All police vehicles shall be provided with the following: 
(a) shutguns with their positions secured 
(b) air conditioning 
(c) grill lights (unmarked vehicles)" 
The demand that all police vehicles be provided with shotguns is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. As stated above, the selection of weapons 
and their tactical deployment is a management prerogative. 
The demand that all police vehicles be provided with air conditioning 
is a mandatory subject of negotiation. We have so ruled in Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB 
1f3075 (1975). The purpose of the demand is to afford physical comfort to the 
employees in their working environment. This relates to a term and condition 
of employment. The cost implications of the demand do not convert it into a 
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matter of management prerogative. We are not persuaded by the City's 
arguments that providing air conditioning in patrol cars has serious 
tactical implications. - -
The demand that all unmarked police vehicles be provided with grill 
lights presents a more difficult problem. The Association argues persuasively 
that the equipment which would be replaced by grill lights (the so-called "Kojak" 
light that is placed on the roof of an unmarked vehicle and the internal 
rotating light that is placed on its dash) presents some hazard to the employees 
riding in the car. On the other hand, the City argues no less persuasively 
that the introduction of grill lights would raise tactical concerns because 
unmarked cars that were so equipped would be more detectable. We have dealt 
with the problem of this kind of demand that has both safety and deployment 
characteristics. In I.A.F.F. of the City of Newburgh, 10 PERB1I3001 (1977) 
we determined that the predominant characteristic of the particular demand there 
at issue was deployment of staff, even though it had significant safety 
implications. Ruling that the demand was not a mandatory subject of negotiatior, 
we said (at page 3003): 
"As we have found here and in other cases, the general subject 
of safety as a means of protecting employees beyond the normal 
hazards inherent in their work is a mandatory item of negotiation. 
Hence, the presence of a general safety clause in the collective 
bargaining agreement should provide a basis for testing the 
safety guarantee in individual fact situations which may arise 
during the life of the agreement by presentation of disputes in 
such specific situations for resolution through the general 
grievance procedure." 
Our analysis in the Newburgh case is applicable to the demand here, and we 
find that this particular demand is not in itself a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
The Sixth Demand 
Demand #34 reads as follows: / f ^ l ^ 
*i M Oil 
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"#34. Hospitalization (Deceased Employees). 
If an active employee with one (1) or more years of service 
or a retired employee deceases, his immediate family shall 
receive the same hospitalization presently provided for said 
employee at no cost to the survivors for a period of one (1) 
year after death." 
This demand is a mandatory subject of negotiation to the extent that 
it applies to persons who are ' . employees at the time of the 
negotiations. It is not a mandatory subject of negotiation to the extent that 
it applies to former employees already retired, Troy Uniformed Firefighters 
Association, supra, at page 3034. See also Allied Chemical and Alkali Worker; 
of America, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 Y.S. 157 (1971). The 
Taylor Law applies only to "public employees", a term defined to mean persons 
"holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public 
employer...." 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the Police Association of New Rochelle, 
Inc., negotiate in good faith with the City of New Rochelle 
with respect to all those demands herein that we determined 
not to be mandatory subjects of negotiation* and, with 
respect to those demands determined to be mandatory subj ects 
of negotiation, the charge herein is dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 2, 1977 
"Robert D. Helsby, ^ airman 
J^seph/R. Crowley "v / 
Ay^-s^^1-—~ 
Ida Klaus** 
* The Association's duty to negotiate in good faith contemplates its withdrawal 
of such demands. £% |*j\J 
** Board-rMember Klaus joins; in this decision,noting that the submission of the 
disputed issues to binding arbitration has terminated the parties' efforts to 
resolve their differences through collective negotiation and has turned the 
dispute over to a third party for final and binding disposition. Accor-
dingly, she finds her dissenting position in Monroe-Woodbury Central 
School District, 10 PERB. 1(3029? not applicable here. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2B-6/2/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2200 
The charge herein was filed by the City of White Plains (City) on 
July 12, 1976. It alleges that the Professional Fire Fighters Association, 
Inc., Local 274, I.A.F.F. (Association) committed an improper practice in vio-
lation of Civil Service Law §209-a.2(b) by refusing to negotiate in good faith 
with the City. The basis for the charge is that the Association has made 
several negotiating demands that do not constitute mandatory subjects of nego-
tiation, and, that, over the objections of the City, it has continued to insist 
upon those demands even after the negotiations dispute was submitted to interest 
arbitration pursuant to CSL §209.4. This case comes to us directly, pursuant 
to §204.4 of our Rules of Procedure for expedited treatment as a scope of nego-
tiations dispute. On March 17, 1977, the City and the Association entered 
into a stipulation in which they specified those demands of the Association 
whose negotiability ! should be determined by this Board. The parties 
have filed briefs in support of their respective positions. 
The charge originally complained about seven separate demands, but the 
parties have stipulated to the withdrawal from consideration by this Board of 
all but three of them. Two of the demands are clauses contained in the last 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 
In the Matter of 
THE PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION 
INC., LOCAL 274, I.A.F.F., 
Respondent, 
-and-
THE CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 
Charging Party. 
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Discussion 
The following demands are the subject of this proceeding and will be 
identified as the parties have identified them in their stipulation. 
"27. In the event that a firefighter is required 
to seek medical attention as a result of an injury 
sustained on the job and such attention causes him to 
return to his assigned station after the end of his 
normal tour, all time after the end of the tour shall 
be paid at the applicable overtime rate." 
The City argues that this proposal, which would require applicable 
overtime pay after a regular tour of duty ends until the employee returns to 
his assigned station, is in reality a demand for compensation for disability 
time, which is exclusively covered by the statutory mandates of §207-a of the 
General Municipal Law and is, therefore, not a mandatory subject of negotia-
tion. It cites our decision in City of Binghamton and Binghamton Firefighters, 
Local 729, I.A.F.F., 9 PERB 3026. The Association, on the other hand, argues 
that this proposal is directed to a situation that is not covered by §207-a. 
The Association states that, under the proposed clause, a firefighter who is 
injured during his tour of duty and obtains medical attention and then returns 
to his assigned station after that tour of duty has ended, but before his next 
tour of duty begins, would be paid the overtime rate for the interim between 
the two tours. The Association argues that only if the next tour of duty has 
begun and any part of it is missed would §207-a be applicable. 
It is our conclusion that the demand is a request for overtime payment 
when medical attention requires an injured firefighter to return to his 
assigned station after the end of his normal tour, but prior to the commencemenl: 
of his next tour. We agree that this demand, at least as interpreted by the 
Association, is not precluded by §207-a of the General Municipal Law. It 
clearly involves a mandatory subject of negotiation, i.e., rate of compensation 
for time spent in connection with work. As such, it is 
appropriate that the demand, including any necessary clarification 
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of the language in which it is presented, be left for resolution in arbitration, 
"1. Article XVIII, REPLACEMENT OF FIRE FIGHTERS AND OFFICERS 
When a vacancy occurs in a competitive class of the Fire 
Department (Fire Fighter, Fire Lieutenant, etc.) and a Civil 
Service eligibility list is in existence for the particular 
grade in which the vacancy exists, it shall be filled as soon 
as possible. A certified Civil Service list shall be in 
existence at all times, except for the position as Chief." 
We have previously held, in City of Albany, 7 PERB 3142 and 
Scarsdale PBA, Inc., 8 PERB 3131, that a demand requiring the filling of 
vacancies could preclude the public employer from effecting a staff reduction 
and that any demand that would restrict reductions in staff size is a permissive 
and not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The Association urges that the 
proposed language here does not require the City to "declare a vacancy" but 
that, if a vacancy is declared by the City, then it should be filled as soon 
as possible. Without passing upon whether the distinction sought to be drawn 
by the Association would alter the essential nature of its demand, we conclude 
that the proposed language cannot be read in the manner urged by the Association 
lAs it is written, the demand would require the City to fill every vacancy, i.e. 
every position that has been vacated. Our prior decisions apply to this proposal. 
The demand is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
"2. Article LIII, ANTI-PISCRIMINATION. 
Neither the City nor any of its agents, representatives or 
employees shall discriminate against, coerce or interfere in 
any way or manner, any member of the Association because of his 
membership or activities in the Association or by reason of his 
being an officer of the Association." 
The City argues that this Board has consistently ruled that public 
employers cannot be compelled to negotiate inclusion in a collective bargaining 
contract of provisions repetitive of those in Statutes, Matter of Scarsdale PBA, 
[inc., 8 PERB 3131; New Rochelle Firefighters, 8 PERB 3124; Albany Police, 7 PERB 
3078. This clause, the Citv urges, merely repeats certain of the statutory 
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rights set forth in §209-a.l of the Civil Service Law (the definition of 
improper practices) and is, therefore, duplicative and nonmandatory. The 
Association asserts that such discrimination clause is a common provision 
in collective bargaining agreements; that it has been in the parties' agreement 
since 1972; and that, although duplicative of the improper practice provisions 
of the Taylor Law, its inclusion in the contract would make alleged violations 
thereof subject to the arbitration clause of the parties' contract. 
We do not 'believe that the issue here should be decided simply on the 
basis that the bargaining demand is repetitive of a statutory provision. The 
particular nature of the proposal raises an important question concerning the 
enforcement of statutory policy regarding the prevention of improper practices 
by a public employer. If this proposal were to be deemed a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, then public employees and public employers xrould be required to 
bargain as to whether procedures, other than those established by this Board 
under the provisions of Civil Service Law §209-a, should be established to 
prevent and to remedy improper practices. 
While the proposal would not, as it indeed could not under the Law, 
preclude the filing of an improper practice charge with this Board, it would pro 
s vide Idireet access to the: grievance procedure, and to;. arbitration as an, alternat 
recourse. The provisioniwould.require ;the arbitrator; to determine in the first 
instance whether the employer had engaged in discriminatory conduct motivated 
by anti-union animus and to fashion a remedy appropriate under the agreement. 
The essential elements of a statutory improper practice would thus be passed 
upon and relief granted in the private arbitration proceeding. Civil Service 
Law §205.5(d) has granted to this Board "exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction" 
to prevent improper practices. In view of the availability of a prescribed 
statutory method for resolving improper practices, and an express legislative 
purpose to vest solely in this Board the -application .<•• of that method, we 
'* iifI 
Lve 
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conclude that the establishment of a different system for resolving what are 
essentially improper practice disputes is not a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. 
Our long-standing policy of deferral to arbitration is not applicable 
to the issue of whether there is a duty to negotiate over a demand to create a 
contract right that duplicates a statutory right. Thus, that policy remains 
unaffected by our decision here (see Matter of New York City Transit, 4 PERB 
3669 and Matter of Board of Education of City of New York, 6 PERB 3022). 
Accordingly, as to the first demand discussed above, we dismiss the 
charge, but sustain the charge as to the second and third demands, and, with 
respect to those demands, 
WE ORDER the respondent, Professional Eire Fighters Association, Inc. 
Local 274, I.A.F.F., to negotiate in good faith with the 
City of White Plains. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 2, 1977 
Robert D. Helsby< Chairman 
Jfest A3b, 
Ida Klaus* 
*Board Member Klaus joins in this decision, noting that the submission of the 
disputed issues to binding arbitration has terminated the parties' efforts to 
resolve their differences through collective negotiation and has turned the 
dispute over to a third party for final and binding disposition. Accordingly, 
she finds her dissenting position in Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, 
10 PERB 113-029, not applicable here. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA-GREENE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE, COLUMBIA COUNTY and GREENE COUNTY, 
Respondents, 
-and-
COLUMBIA-GREENE COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
#20-6/2/77 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2297 
The matter herein comes to us upon the exceptions of the charging party, 
Columbia-Greene Community College Faculty Association,to a hearing officer's 
decision dismissing its charge. That charge had alleged that the Board of 
Trustees of Columbia-Greene Community College, Columbia County and Greene 
County (respondents) had committed an improper practice in violation of CSL 
§§209-a.l(a) and (d) in that they failed to pay salary increments during nego-
tiations for a successor to the expired 1974-76 collective agreement. The 
hearing officer dismissed the charge. He had found that the charging party had 
failed to prove that there had been a long-standing and continual practice of 
paying increments at the beginning of a new school year. Therefore, he reasoned 
there had been no unilateral change in an existing term, and condition of 
employment. 
Charging party's exceptions would have us reject the hearing officer's 
interpretation of the evidence. They argue that the facts support a conclusion 
that there was a long-standing and continual practice of providing increments. 
This argument is now irrelevant. On May 12, 1977, the New York Court of Appeals 
determined that it is not a violation of an employer's duty to maintain the 
status quo during negotiations for it to withhold increments, Rockland County 
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BOCES v. PERB, 
-2-
NY2d 
Accordingly, 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 2, 1977 
Robert D. Helsby<""Chairman 
KJLAJ00?$< Vt 
Jose^ i R . C r o w l e y " / 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YOKK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #2D-6/2/77 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF AUBURN, NEW YORK, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
AUBURN POLICE LOCAL 195, COUNCIL 82, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Auburn (City) on January 20, 
1977. It alleges that Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Local 195), committed an improper practice in violation of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,(the Act)^ . ISectiori 209-a.2(b> by 
refusing to negotiate in good faith with the City. The basis for the charge 
is that Local 195 has made several negotiating demands that do not constitute 
mandatory subjects of negotiation and that, over the objections of the City, 
it has continued to insist upon those demands even after the negotiations 
dispute was submitted to interest arbitration pursuant to CSL §209.4. 
On February 3, 1977, the City and Local 195 entered into a stipulation 
which specifies those demands of Local 195 that the City alleges to be non-
mandatory subjects of negotiation. All of these demands are 
contained in a proposed new article to be entitled, "Discipline and Discharge". 
That article would expand the article in the prior agreement entitled, 
"Grievances and Arbitration". It is designed to supplement and modify the 
disciplinary procedures specified in CSL §75. Among other things, it would: 
a. impose a one-year period of limitation upon the bringing of 
disciplinary charges, while the statute contains a three-year 
period of limitation; M*^M M 
BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
CASE No. U-2510 
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b. restrict disciplinary action to reprimands, fines, suspensions 
not in excess of thirty days, and dismissal, whereas the statute 
permits disciplinary action to include "a reprimand, a fine not to 
exceed one hundred dollars..., suspension without pay for a 
period not exceeding two months, demotion in grade and title, or 
dismissal from the service;" and 
c. require that "Notice of proposed disciplinary action against an 
employee must be given to the employee, the union president and 
the employee's union steward", whereas the statute specifies only 
' that "the person against whom...disciplinary action is proposed 
shall have written notice thereof...." 
The dispute is one that raises questions concerning the scope of 
negotiations under the Act and it has been processed under §204.4 of our 
Rules. Under this procedure, there has been no intermediate report by a 
hearing officer; rather, the stipulation and the pleadings, which constitute 
the record of the proceeding, and the parties' memoranda of law, were 
submitted directly to this Board. Thereafter, we requested and 
heard oral argument and received supplemental briefs. 
In its written and oral presentations, Local 195 argues that the modi-
fication of statutory disciplinary procedures is a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation so long as the individual employee may choose between the statutory 
and the contractual disciplinary procedures. From its point of view, it is 
also significant that its demands do not require anything that is prohibited 
by the terms of CSL §75. Rather, the employer is requested in some respects 
to obligate itself to exercise its Section 75 discretion in the negotiating 
process by granting additional procedural protections to employees (e.g. notice 
to the union of the employer's intention to bring a charge), or, in other 
instances, to refrain from exercising the full limits of the discretion,, 
Board - U-2510 
-3 
accorded it by law (e.g.(l) by reducing the time limitations for bringing a 
charge below the maximum allowed by the statute; (2) by imposing a penalty of 
demotion in grade or suspension without pay for a shorter period of time than 
the maximum allowed by the statute). 
For its part, the City argues that the subject of employee discipline 
is neither a mandatory nor a prohibited subject of negotiation, but that it is 
a permissive one as to which the employer may choose to negotiate. In support 
of this proposition, it argues that the subject of discharge and discipline is 
governed by §§75 and 76 of the Civil Service Law and, in the case of some 
policemen, also by §891 of the Unconsolidated Laws. 
We do not agree with either of the parties. Except for employees of 
the State of New York, the statutory provisions relating to removal and other 
disciplinary proceedings are preemptive of the subject matter and are not 
open to collective negotiation. In 1972, CSL §76.4 was amended to 
include the following language: 
"Such sections [CSL sections 75 and 76] may be supplemented, 
modified or replaced by agreements negotiated between the 
state and an employee organization pursuant to article 
fourteen of this chapter." (Emphasis supplied) 
In his memorandum, the Governor explained that this amendment would "permit 
Sections 75 and 76 to be replaced by provisions contained in a negotiated 
agreement;", New York State Legislative Annual, 1972, page 39. 
It is significant that the only public employer to which the 1972 
amendment applies is New York State. McKinney's Statutes, §240, states: 
'The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applied 
in the construction of the statutes, so that where a law 
expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to 
which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn 
that what is omitted or not included was intended to be 
omitted or excluded." 
Supporting our conclusion that the reference to the State in CSL §76.4 excludes 
other governments is S. 4482, a 1977 program bill of the Governor, is^ ii'shf^ among 
other things, would amend CSL §76.4 by substituting the phrase, "a public 
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employer" for "the state" and would introduce similar language into §3020-a 
of the Education Law. The Governor's supporting memorandum states that "The 
bill would amend Section 76 of the Civil Service Law and Section 3020-a of the 
Education Law to_ permit all public employers to negotiate disciplinary and 
dismissal procedures in their collective agreements with employee organi-
zations." (emphasis added) 
Under the present law, public employers other than the State of New 
York are not permitted to negotiate collective agreements containing disciplinai 
procedures that would supplement, modify or replace the provisions of CSL §§75 
or 76. Local 195's demands would do this. Accordingly, they are prohibited 
subjects of negotiation. Local 195's insistence upon bringing those demands 
to an interest arbitrator is a violation of its duty to negotiate in good faith 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER Local 195 to negotiate in good faith with the 
City of Auburn. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 2, 1977 -
Robert D. Helsby. /Chai airman 
^ i d g ^ 
Ida Klaus * 
*Board Member Klaus joins in this decision, "noting that the submission of the 
disputed issues to binding arbitration has terminated the parties' efforts to 
resolve their differences through collective negotiation and has turned the 
dispute over to a third party for final and binding disposition. Accordingly, 
she finds her dissenting position in Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, 
10 PERB 113029, not applicable here. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLXC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS \,OARD 
In the Matter of 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
COUNTY OF ALBANY, 
#2E-6/2/77 
Employer, 
and CASE NO. c-1478 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC. , 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE '"'""" 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the • 
Rules of Procedure of .the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Bo'ard by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, • 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service
 :Employees 
Association, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit:. Included: All full-time (30 hours or more) employees 
of the employer. 
Excluded: Commissioner of Health; Deputy Commissioner of 
Health; Director of Public' Health Nursing 
Services; Assistant Director of Public Health 
Nursing Services; Director of Environmental 
Health Services; employees in the Methadone Main-
tenance Program and Environmental Management 
Council and employees in management-confidential 
positions. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
tfith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall, 
egotiate collectively with such employes organization in the 
determination of, and eidmdnistration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 2nd day of J u n e 1977 
J o s e p h R. Crowley / 
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